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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TEGUCIGALPA 000542

SIPDIS

NOFORN

STATE FOR DS/DSS/ITA, DS/OP/WHA, S/CT, AND WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/08/2014

TAGS: [ASEC](#) [PTER](#) [PGOV](#) [HO](#)

SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ)
FOR HONDURAS

REF: A. 04 STATE 28688

[B](#). 03 TEGUC 02231

[C](#). 03 TEGUC 01144

Classified By: DCM Roger Pierce, Reason 1.5 (C) and (D)

[1](#). (U) The following responses are keyed to the Security Environment Profile Questionnaire (ref A).

POLITICAL VIOLENCE

[1](#). (SBU) Demonstrations:

(1-A.) Yes. Additionally, there are a number of organizations and groups under the loose collective leadership of (and affiliated with) the Bloque Popular that have been carrying out anti-American demonstrations, as well as demonstrations targeting local issues. The following organizations have been involved in anti-American political activities to varying degrees. They are listed in alphabetical order, utilizing Spanish acronyms where applicable. (List updated October 2003):

- ARTISTAS DE LA UNAH

Artists of the National Autonomous University of Honduras (UNAH)

- BLOQUE POPULAR
Popular Block

- COCOH
Farmers' Cooperatives Union

- CODECOH
Honduran Consumer Protection Committee

- CODEH
Honduran Committee for Human Rights

- COFADEH
Honduran Committee of Family Members of the Detained and Disappeared

- COHAPAZ
Honduran Committee for Action for Peace

- COLPROSUMAH
Honduran Professional Teachers College

- COMPA-H
People of the Americas Convergence Movement
(COMPA)- Honduras

- COPEMH
Honduran Association of Secondary School Teachers

- COPINH
Civic Council of Popular Organizations and Indigenous Groups of Honduras (also appears as COPIN)

- COPRUMH
Honduran Professional Association Teachers' Union

- CGT
General Workers Central (the largest of Honduras' three national labor confederations)

- CTH
Confederation of Honduran Workers (probably, the strongest of the three national labor confederations)

- CUTH
United Confederation of Honduran Workers (the most left of the three national labor confederations)

- FPR
Popular Revolution Forces, A shadowy alleged revolutionary group. See Reftel C for details.

- FUTTH

United Federation of Honduran Workers (the largest component of CUTH, above)

- FSM
Feminist Movement (details needed)

- FUR
University Revolutionary Front
- GRUPO LOS NECIOS DE LA UNAH
UNAH Fools Group - Activist group in UNAH that "cheerleads" and motivates demos

- MEH
Honduran Student Movement
- PARTIDO DE LOS TRABAJADORES DE LA FACULTAD DE PEDAGOGIA DE LA UNAH
Teaching Faculty Workers' Party of UNAH

- RADIO GUALCHO
Leftist/Activist radio station (1510Mhz) that works closely with Bloque Popular and is actively involved in most demonstrations

- REPRESENTANTE DE FRENTE Y REFORMA DE LA UNAH
Reform Front Representative of UNAH

- SERUNAH
New UNAH coalition group, like Bloque Popular

- SETROINFOP
Details Needed

- SITRAINA
National Agrarian Institute Workers' Union

- SITRAIHSS
Institute of Social Security Workers' Union

- SITRAUNAH
UNAH Workers' Union

- SITRAUPEN
A Workers' Union (details needed)

- STIBYS
Beverage and Associated Industries Workers' Union
(plays a key organizing and logistics role for many demos)- Leader of STIBYS is also the leader of the Popular Block.

- SITRAPANI
Child Welfare Association Workers' Union

- UD
Democratic Unification Party (remnants of the Communist Party of Honduras and other former Marxist parties; represented in the National Congress)

- UNAH
National Autonomous University of Honduras

- URP
Revolutionary People's Union

NOTE: The most fervent anti-U.S. groups are: MEH, URP, UD, Bloque Popular, STIBYS, COPINH and COMPA-H. The following groups have committed and participated in violent acts against the Honduran Government and other entities: Bloque Popular, COPINH, Democratic Unification Party (UD) and The Revolutionary People's Union (URP).

(1-B.) Yes. There have been 29 demonstrations in Tegucigalpa since January 2003. While not all demonstrations are directed against the U.S. Government, almost all demonstrations have some undertone of anti-U.S. sentiment. Demo dates: 01/25/03, 01/30/03, 02/15/03, 03/8/03 03/27/03, 08/27/03, 09/04/03, 09/05/03, 09/11/03, 09/16/03, 09/17/03, 09/19/03, 10/02/03, 10/09/03, 10/29/03, 11/05/03, 11/20/03, 11/21/03, 11/26/03, 11/27/03, 11/28/03, 12/08/03, 12/11/03, 12/17/03, 12/19/03, 01/22/04, 02/06/04, 02/18/04, 03/02/04.

(1-C.) About half of the demonstrations listed above have taken place at or near U.S. Mission facilities.

(1-D.) The size of anti-American demonstrations at the Embassy varies from twenty to over three hundred participants. The larger demos usually consist of supporters from six to more than twelve different organizations, which operate as a loosely structured coalition under the guidance of Bloque Popular.

(1-E.) While there are demonstrations based on local issues, such as civil service salaries, privatization, IMF requirements, etc. U.S. actions in Iraq and the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), and U.S. involvement in Venezuela and Haiti have become the current focus. The

following statements, demands and gestures have been made repeatedly during past demos at the Embassy: No to war in Iraq, No to war, Stop Plan Colombia, Pro-Human rights, World Peace, Stop Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), U.S. Forces out of Honduras (Soto Cano AB), burning U.S. flags, U.S. Military out of Cuba, U.S. destroy your WMD, Stop intervention in Venezuela, Stop Standard Fruit exploiting the indigenous people, No to CAFTA, No to privatization, Stop intervention in Haiti.

(1-F.) Generally peaceful, but demonstrators have burned U.S. flags, painted slogans on Mission outer perimeter walls and utilized homemade mortars to detonate large fireworks charges that are propelled high into the air before exploding.

(1-G.) N/A.

(1-H.) N/A.

(1-I.) Yes.

(1-J.) Yes. Occasionally they will pass by the Embassy.

(1-K.) The size varies from a few hundred to 5-10 thousand people.

(1-L.) Generally peaceful but fences, grillwork and windows have been destroyed near the National Congress and many tires burned. At times, suspected plain-clothes police have been held and beaten by hard-core protesters within the demonstrations.

On occasions, small groups of thug-like cadre have initiated/instigated violence against static police guards by attempting to strike them in the lower leg areas not protected by riot shields, with heavy placard poles with large nails embedded in the ends. Several police officials have been injured in unsuccessful attempts to get the police to use force.

(1-M.) N/A.

2. (SBU) Macro Conflict Conditions:

(2-A.) NO.

(2-B.) N/A.

(2-C.) N/A.

(2-D.) N/A.

3. (SBU) Host Country Capabilities:

(3-A.) No.

(3-B.) Yes. Training by US Border Patrol(BorTac) Teams good, but GOH security infrastructure needs major improvements.

(3-C.) Yes.

(3-D.) No. However, GOH intelligence units have an institutional awareness of and a modest capability of penetrating indigenous radical groups.

(3-E.) Yes.

(3-F.) No.

(3-G.) Yes.

(3-H.) Average/Below Average.

(3-I.) Average/Ineffective.

(3-J.) Average/Ineffective. A relatively new unit within the Ministry of Public Security called the Frontier Police has been established to handle border patrol duties. The unit is making positive steps towards border control but lack of funding and manpower are limiting the effectiveness of the unit.

4. (SBU) Indigenous Terrorism-Anti American Terrorist Groups:

(4-A.) No.

(4-B.) N/A.

(4-C.) N/A.

(4-D.) N/A.

(4-E.) N/A.

(4-F.) N/A.

(4-G.) N/A.

(4-H.) N/A.

15. (SBU) Other Indigenous Terrorist Groups:

(5-A.) No.

(5-B.) N/A.

(5-C.) N/A.

(5-D.) N/A.

(5-E.) N/A.

16. (C/NF) Transnational Terrorism-Transnational Terrorist Indicators:

(6-A.) No. However, there are rumors that there are Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), IRA, and Chiapas (Zapatistas) sympathizers in Honduras who could be involved in advising indigenous groups. Some Hondurans are studying in Cuba and also conceivably could be receiving training in subversion and terrorism, although it is more likely they are being indoctrinated as agents of influence. As this Cuban program for Hondurans is in its infancy, there have been no indications that such training is taking place.

(6-B.) N/A.

(6-C.) N/A.

(6-D.) N/A and NO.

(6-E.) N/A.

(6-F.) The only known hostile intelligence presence of note is Cuban. While the Cuban mission appears to have extensive contacts with leftists and indigenous groups, there is no indication they are planning or supporting terrorism.

(6-H.) There is no shortage of weapons in Honduras. It would also not be difficult for hostile terrorist elements to import weapons and/or explosives from neighboring countries.

PALMER